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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Under Section 58-37-13, Addendum 1, defendant was for-
feited. See findings and conclusions, Addendum 2, and judg-
ment, Addendum 3. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant's objections (R 20), motions to dismiss (R 20) 
and suppress (R 13) were heard at the non-jury trial. The 
court took the matters under advisement. Judge Fishier dictated 
his Ruling of forfeiture into the record (R 344). 
Defendant's motion to reconsider with objections (R 72M) 
and memorandum (R 72C) were argued (R 73). Thereafter, findings, 
conclusions (R 72U) and judgment of forfeiture (R 72X) were 
entered. 
Defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The required quasi-criminal evidence is not sub-
stantial and is insufficient to justify or support the findings, 
conclusions and judgment of forfeiture. 
II. The trial court erred and abused its discretion (1) 
in failing to follow the forfeiture standards prescribed in the 
cases in the record (R 21 and R 72E-72F) , (2) in denying defen-
dant's motions to suppress and dismiss, and (3) in forfeiting 
the motorcycle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prosecutor stated in court, "We're basing the for-
feiture on, not what occurred on June 3, not what occurred-
actually, I believe 16 days later at the impound lot, but what 
happened on the 24th of May," (R 99); and 
"If he has no knowledge of what is occurring, then it 
cannot be forfeited," (R 112); and 
"We intend to introduce the items that we found at that 
time," (R 115). 
The Court: You have someone to testify on May 24 that 
saw Dr. Erickson get items from the motorcycle, which were later 
determined to be contraband under a substances control act. The 
prosecutor responded, "That's correct," (R 115). 
Dr. Verd J. Erickson was practicing dentistry during May 
and June 1985 at Wind River Dental, Ltd., in Taylorsville, Utah, 
(Exs. 1-P through 6-P). He had never seen undercover Officer 
Celeste Paquette alias Kris Gordon before May 24 (R 271). She 
called for an appointment and went to his Office on May 24, 1985 
(R 266). Dr. Erickson examined her teeth, took x-rays and sold 
her a bottle of Flogel (R 320). 
Paquette returned to his Office about 5:00 p.m. May 24. 
She was told by the receptionist to return about 6:00 p.m. (R 141). 
She returned about 6:00 p.m. and had a conversation with Dr. 
Erickson in his Office (R 142). During this time Officers Mayo 
and Huggard remained outside listening to the conversation by wire 
transmitter (R 213) and Mayo took pictures (R 239). 
Paquette testified that Dr. Erickson went outside to his 
motorcycle and "took something out * * * I thought he was getting 
a prescription pad" (R 142), and that he came back into the 
office, opened the prescription bottle and there were some 
yellow tablets and 3 black capsules, and she purchased them for 
$60.00, (R 143). 
Mayo testified that he "took all of the pictures," (R 237). 
See plaintiff's exhibits 1-P through 6-P. 
Only exhibit 1-P is in evidence taken on May 24 about 
5:05 p.m. 
Mayo was at the office on May 24 when Paquette came out 
about 5:00 p.m. (R 238) and he was at the office when Paquette 
went inside about 6:00 p.m. (R 214). He testified that the 
doctor went to the back of his motorcycle, opened up the trunk 
compartment, took something out, walked back into the office 
(R 241), but there is no photograph of this scene in evidence. 
Officer Huggard testified that he believed that he "did 
not take the photo," (R 193); that the first time he saw Dr. 
Erickson was whenever Dr. Erickson was with Paquette coming out 
the door, and "I saw him get on his motorcycle, drive and get 
out onto the freeway. That would be the last time I saw him," 
(R 198). After the noon recess (R 206), he was recalled and on 
redirect testified that he had a conversation with the prosecutor 
during the noon recess and that he was correcting some of his 
testimony as to May 24, to-wit: "on the 24th he did take some-
thing out of the saddlebag or something off the bike, and then 
go back inside," (R 208). 
Some of Dr. Erickson's accepted proffer (R 322) is that 
on May 24th * * * "He did not go to his motorbike while he was 
talking to Officer Paquette. When she came in, he went to his 
pocket and he had this contraband in his pocket. He gave her 
the contraband out of his pocket, out of his coat pocket" * * *; 
and that he * * * "did not put any controlled substance in that 
motorbike and he * * * did not take any contraband out of that 
motorbike on the 24th—anytime in the month of May." * * * 
(R 324) On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Dr. Erickson, 
* * * "You didn't go out to the bike and get the amphetamines? 
A. That's correct, sir." (R 333). 
Exhibits 2-P through 6-P were taken by Mayo on May 31st. 
Nothing was purchased by Paquette on May 31st, (R 283). 
All of plaintiff's evidence was objected to being received 
in evidence (R 290). 
The uncontradicted value of the motorcycle is $8,449.00 
(R 8 and R 328). 
The sale of the contraband to Paquette on May 24 was 
$60.00 (R 283). 
Note: Dr. Ericksonfs conviction was affirmed (Utah) 722 
P.2d 756. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(1) There is insufficient nexus between the contraband 
and motorcycle. 
(2) Plaintiff's quasi-criminal evidence does not rise 
to the level of a forfeiture violation. 
(3) The judgment of forfeiture is an unduly harsh and 
extreme punishment: $8,449.0 0 motorcycle (R 8 and 328) versus 
$60.00 contraband (R 283), State v. One Porsche (Utah) infra in 
force and effect on March 17, 1986 prior to One 1983 Pontiac 
(4-23-86) infra. 
(4) The absence of search and seizure warrant(s) violates 
Arkansas, Coolidge and Harris, infra and cases cited therein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REQUIRED QUASI-CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY OR SUPPORT THE FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE. 
Kindly see plaintiff's photograph, Exhibit 1-P, taken by 
Officer Mayo on May 24, 1985, at 5:05 p.m. 
Officers Paquette, Mayo and Huggard returned to the 
Dental Office May 24th about 6:00 p.m. (R 239). Paquette was 
wired and went into the Office. Mayo and Huggard remained out-
side in their car to monitor the conversation between Paquette 
and Dr. Erickson (R 239). 
Paquette testified that she alerted Mayo and Huggard by 
wire that Dr. Erickson was going outside to his motorcycle 
(R 142), but there is no photograph in evidence that Dr. Erickson 
went to his motorcycle on May 24. 
Mayo testified that he took a couple of other photographs 
(R 239); which are not in evidence. 
11Q. What did the doctor do?" 
"A. The doctor went to the back of his motorcycle, 
opened up the trunk compartment, took something 
out, walked back into the Office." 
"Q. And did you take a picture of that?" 
"A. No sir, I did not." (R 241) 
There is no photograph in evidence other than plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1-P for May 24; whereas rio "purchases" were made on May 
31 (R 283) yet Mayo took photographs, Exhibits 2-P through 6-P, 
on May 31, during 5-6:00 p.m. 
No photographs are in evidence for June 3rd. 
The lack of photographs on May 24th (1) gives greater 
credibility to Dr. Ericksonfs testimony that "he did not go to 
his motorbike" (R 322-333) and (2) de-minimizes the required 
sufficiency of evidence to support a forfeiture. 
It is incredible that Officer Huggard, a policeman for 
10 years (R 189), changed his testimony after the noon recess 
conversation with the prosecutor (R 206) from first seeing Dr. 
Erickson and Paquette coming out of the door and Dr. Erickson 
driving away on his motorcycle to seeing Dr. Erickson on the 
24th take something out of the saddlebag and then go back inside 
his office (R 209). This vacillation denigrates their evidence* 
Plaintiff's evidence does not rise to the dignity of a 
violation, U.S. v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F.Supp 1200 and cases 
cited therein. There is insufficient nexus between the May 24th 
contraband and the motorcycle, U.S. v. One 1976 Ford, 769 F.2d 
525, and there is no substantial connection, U.S. v. One 1974 
Cadillac, 575 F.2d 344. Kindly see cases cited at (R 72C-72F) 
and defendant's argument (R 73-84). 
There is no nexus between the motorcycle and (1) the con-
versation (R 273) on May 31st, and (2) the June 3rd arrest. 
"At anytime on the 3rd of June when you made that purchase did 
you see those items—the demerol, the amphetamines—come out 
of the motorcycle? A. No * * * they were in the office when I 
saw them" * * * (R 283) . 
"The guilt or innocence of the owner of the vehicle is 
not in issue." * * * "The only issue is whether the vehicle 
was used in violation of law." State v. One 1977 Buick (Conn.) 
493 A.2d, at 882. There is no evidence that Dr. Erickson put 
any contraband in or on the motorcycle and no evidence that he 
transported any contraband. 
State v. One Porsche (Utah), 526 P.2d 917 was and is 
applicable in this case because State of Utah v. One 1983 Pontiac 
(April 23, 1986), 717 P.2d 1338, is not retroactive. (The judg-
ment of forfeiture is March 17, 1986 in this case.) 
The motorcycle did not violate Section 58-37-13. The 
motorcycle is innocent. It was not used to transport or convey 
contraband. Dr. Erickson had no knowledge of any contraband in 
or on the motorcycle. Sec. 58-37-13(e)(ii) is an exception to 
forfeiture. 
* * * "On legal issues we do not defer to the trial court"s 
ruling; * * * A reversal on questions of fact is appropriate 
only if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings 
of the trial court." * * * "We reverse only if appellant shows 
that the trial court abused its discretion." * * * Gillmor v. 
Gillmor (Utah) 657 P.2d, at 739. Substantial or sufficient 
quasi-criminal evidence is not here. 
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,infra , at 172, "We hold that 
the constitutional exclusionary rule does apply to such for-
feiture proceedings and consequently reverse the judgment of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court;" the officers did not have 
either a search or arrest warrant, and at p. 176, the court 
concluded that the exclusionary rule "is obligatory upon the 
states under the 14th Amendment" and that "the exclusionary 
rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings;" and proof pre-
sented by the government must not be tainted. 
There were no exigent circumstances or hot pursuit, and 
the officers had no warrants (R 285) on May 24, May 31, or on 
June 3, 1985. A warrant was required, Ark, v. Sanders, 61 L.Ed. 
2d 235; Coolidge v. N.H., 30 L.Ed.2d 120; State v. Harris (Utah 
1983) 671 P.2d 175. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION (1) IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE FOR-
FEITURE STANDARDS PRESCRIBED IN THE CASES 
IN THE RECORD (R 21 and R 72E-72F), (2) IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND 
DISMISS, AND (3) IN FORFEITING THE MOTOR-
CYCLE . 
The reason forfeiture proceedings are so characterized 
by the U. S. Supreme Court as quasi-criminal, is that "for-
feiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense" (R 21) 
cited cases before the trial court, Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616; 
Janis 428 U.S., at 447; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pa., 14 L. 
Ed.2d 170; "though they may be civil in form, are in nature 
criminal," Boyd, supra. 
There is no evidence that on May 24th Dr. Erickson was 
involved in substantial criminal enterprise. (See cited cases 
at R 72E-72F). He first saw Paquette on May 24th. 
The lack of quasi-criminal evidence and the authorities 
cited by defendant (R 13, R 20, R 31) supported defendant's 
motions to suppress and dismiss and objections to forfeiture. 
The lack of evidence nullifies forfeiture. 
CONCLUSION 
Manifest injustice should be prevented. Insufficient 
evidence is no basis for forfeiture. 
Plaintiff's evidence does not rise to the level of quasi-
criminal evidence upon which to base forfeiture. 
The judgment of forfeiture should be reversed. On remand 
the motorcycle, or the value thereof $8,449.00, should be returned 
to Dr. Erickson. 
October J 1986. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
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58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure. (1) The 
following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them: 
(a) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this act; 
(b) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or 
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act; 
(c) All property used or intended for use as a container for property described 
in subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b) of this section; 
(d) All hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not to include 
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use 
to administer controlled substances in violation of this act; 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels used or intended for 
use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, pos-
session, or concealment of property described in (l)(a) or (l)(b) of this section, 
except that: 
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction 
of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under this section unless it 
appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consent-
ing party or privy to violation of this act; and 
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this section by reason of any act 
or omission established by the owner to have been committed or omitted without 
his knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest shall 
be subject to the interest of the secured party upon the party's showing he could 
not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take 
place in the use of the conveyance. 
(f) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and 
data used or intended for use, in violation of this act. 
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By: PAUL F. IWASAKI 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
V. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ONE SILVER HONDA MOTORCYCLE, ) 
UTAH REGISTRATION 5P218, Civil No. C85-3935 
VIN 1HESC0229CA235970, ) 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 14th day of August, 1985, before the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, Third District Court Judge. Present were Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney Roger S. Blaylock for the State of Utah, and 
Walker E. Anderson for Verd Erickson, a party in interest. Wit-
nesses were sworn, testimony was taken, memoranda were submitted; 
the Court ruled in favor of forfeiture. Counsel for Verd Erickson 
submitted an objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and made a motion to reconsider, a hearing was held on the 
10th day of March, 1986, at 10:30 a.m., present were Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney Roger S. Blaylock for the State of Utah, and 
Walker E. Anderson for Verd Erickson. The Court again ruled in 
H.D::-., ..:•'CLERK 
' OuWY CLERK 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C85-3935 
Page 2 
favor of forfeiture and denied counsel's objection and motion; 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises does hereby 
enter the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the 24th day of May, 1985, Officer Paquette made 
contact with Dr. Erickson. 
2. On the 31st day of May, 1985, Officer Paquette had 
subsequent contact with Dr. Erickson. 
3. On the 24th day of May, 1985, Officer Paquette 
obtained contraband from Dr. Erickson. 
4. On the 3rd day of June, 1985, further contraband 
was purchased by Officer Paquette from Dr. Erickson for $5,000. 
5. Other officers arrested Dr. Erickson on the 3rd day 
of June, 1985, for the events of May 24, May 31, and June 3, 1985. 
6. On the 24th day of May, 1985, Dr. Erickson took 
contraband amphetamines from the defendant motorcycle. 
7. Prior to the 3rd day of Juner 1985, there had been 
no search of Dr. Erickson's office. 
8. On the first meeting the undercover officer entered 
the office as invited public. 
9. On the 24th day of May, and the 3rd day of June, 
1985, the undercover officer entered the office as a patient. 
10. There was probable cause for the police to make a 
warrantless arrest on the 3rd day of June, 1985. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C85-3935 
Page 3 
11. A reasonable person in Dr. Erickson's position 
would not have had his will overcome by the actions of the police. 
12. On one occasion Dr. Erickson dickered about getting 
too little for the amphetamines previously sold. 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact, does now enter the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The police did not entrap Dr. Erickson. 
2. The defendant vehicle should be forfeited to the 
State of Utah for disposition in accordance with Section 58-37-13, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this / / ^ a y of (pfitfrunry, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
.1 • 
HILIP R. TISHLER 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Verd Erickson 
ATTEST 
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• : . • • ' ' • ; • ; • • • - \ $ * * * * 
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T . L . "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ONE SILVER HONDA MOTORCYCLE, 
UTAH REGISTRATION 5P218, 
VIN 1HESC0229CA235970, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE 
Civil No. C85-3935 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby enter the following 
Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
defendant one 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, Utah Registration 
5P218, VIN 1HFSC0229CA235970, be, and the same is hereby adjudged 
forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Title 58, Chap-
ter 37, Section 13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and 
that said automobile be delivered to the State Department of 
Finance to be sold at public auction or disposed of according to 
(WS~* 373*? 
Judgment of Forfeiture 
C85-3935 
Page 2 
the provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 13, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
/U&ACU 
DATED this | / day of fabruory, 1986. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
\\' GLkk+^£-i CvvJ^ W&*-^ 
BY THE COURT 
3» 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Verd Erickson 
FISHLER, Judge 
ATTEST 
H.DiXONHlNOLEY 
Otouty Cterk 
AkD£/Vhl/Ao-*~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that 4 copies were hand-delivered to The 
Attorney General's Office, The Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this / day of Q C T 0 & £ K , 1986. 
VlcML£ < 6v/vvflZ IJ^Mr^^ 
Walker E. Anderson 
